In Defense of the Bush Doctrine a Book Review

1 In Defense of the Bush Doctrine, by Robert G. Kaufman, The University Press of Kentucky, Lexington, Kentucky, 2007. Started: March 8, 2006 Finished: March 10, 2008, Revised: March 13, 2008 Robert G. Kaufman’s “In Defense of the Bush Doctrine” is an extremely well written book that should be read and kept nearby the desks of all policy makers in the United States because it gives an in-depth critique of the many ways of dealing with international relations throughout the history of the United States and the world, shows how they have developed, how they have worked, and most importantly what is most important to maintaining the security of the United States today. It is for these reasons that it should also be a mainstay of every college syllabus dealing with American foreign policy, how you arrive at a coherent policy that works in the interest of the United States and how you maintain these policies internally and externally to achieve security of the United States. The “Bush Doctrine”, also officially titled by its less politically charged name, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 2002 [NSS 9/02], is the current synthesis of the way that the United States can maintain our security at home while making the world a safer and better place abroad. It is the United States first attempt to formalize how the United States should deal with the proven fact that America is under attack by non nation entities who wish to use “weapons of mass destruction” against us and our allies as demonstrated by the events of September 11, 2001. “In Defense of the Bush Doctrine [NSS 9/02] is a challenge to the detractors of our proactive foreign policy at home to rejuvenate a new consensus that will be shared across both parties in Congress, to force academia to come up with a policy that suggests more than emotion, hope and faith to achieve America’s goals as opposed the reality and hard work set forth in NSS 9/02, and to pass this challenge on to other countries who benefit from our efforts, even those who do not help us in doing the heavy lifting. Critics should analyze their proposed courses of action to see if their plans will forestall the failures by the Kaufman critique of their anticipated modus operandi, a rigorous standard to meet. Thucydides prescient analysis of the causes of war, “fear, honor, and interest” is constants that stand the test of time and are with us today. The maxims of Donald M. Kagan’s “On the Origins of War” that postulate that most wars, maybe not all, can be prevented or limited, by having the power to be Clear, Capable, and Credible still works, and although designed to operate in the national state system, it can and should be applied to states that harbor terrorists and to the terrorists themselves. These are the cornerstones of NSS 9/02 and for Kaufman’s “moral democratic realism’. Moral democratic realism offers a more compelling framework for American grand strategy than the alternatives because it takes due measure of the centrality of power and the constraints [that] the dynamics of international politics impose, without depreciating the significance of ideals, ideology, and regime type. It ground American foreign policy in Judeo-Christian conceptions of man, morality, and prudence that inoculate us against two dangerous fallacies: a utopianism that exaggerates the potential for cooperation without power; and an unrealistic realism that underestimates the potentialities for achieving decency and provisional justice even in international relations. it rest on a conception of self-interest, well understood, and respect for the 2 decent opinions of mankind, without making international institutions or the fickle mistress of often-indecent international public opinion the polestar for American action. The precepts of moral democratic realism emerge from the lessons of American diplomatic history.1 In addition to Kaufman proving the benefits of moral democratic realism, he offers the reader insight on other factors facing American policy makers in our troubled world today. Kaufman has no angst concerning why America has been targeted by terrorists. While others may say it is a tribal or semi tribal reaction to modernity, especially equal rights for women, he says we are the target because of “the very freedom America personifies.”2 Kaufman takes on the pabulum that force is only to be used as a last resort in protecting your national interest, which also includes the security of your allies. One of the problems of withholding the option of using force sooner as opposed to later is that when you come to your “later”, force may be the only option and it may be too late. “Whether the United States resorts to force sooner rather than later is a prudential judgment, not a categorical one. It depends upon the gravity of the danger, the probability of its realization, the availability of alternative means and the prospects for success.”3 Prudence is a word and concept the Kaufman uses throughout his treatise. It is a key concept of his democratic moral realism, even in a unipolar world with the United States is the only superpower. This concept acknowledges that the United States cannot impose its will throughout the world for intrinsic good or for self-interest because our power is limited and when push comes to shove, it should only be expended in our national interest. Freeing Tibet, something the United Nations could not stop Red China from taking over, is justly beyond our means and capability. We can at best, hope to keep China from using all its force against the Tibetans. In Kaufman’s words, “The cardinal virtue of prudence—choosing right ends and right means—must guide when, how, and for what purpose the Unites States resorts to military force. Prudence require that the United States keep its powder ready, dry, and ample to defeat actual, imminent, or gather dangers to vital interests of the Unites States and its pivotal allies.”4 Kaufman while acknowledging the fact that the loss of American people’s will to persevere in the trying conditions that we face today within the American political system could lead to a catastrophic defeat and surrender to terrorist forces to achieve “peace”, the thrust of his belief in our successful victory in the war on terrorism is his prescient preoccupation with the rise of China and our need for a successful democratic India to help balance the rising power of China. Kaufman’s concern is that China needs to be brought into the world system as an integral part of the system, not as one who will use its emerging power to recreate the Chinese Empire of the Mongols. Kaufman sees moral democratic realism as the best very as well a test case for American moral democratic realism. “A mixed strategy—continuing to engage China economically but containing Chinese military power vigilantly—accords best with the lessons of American diplomacy and the policy of moral democratic realism.”5 The wild card and possible test in this scenario will be the Taiwan issue; one that the world should hope is never played. I would like to share Kaufman’s latent “confidence that the general principles of the Bush Doctrine [NSS 9/02] will endure as a guide for American foreign policy no matter what happens in Iraq.”6 My hope that he is correct because the moral democratic realism that is embodied in NSS 9/02 offers a cogent way to maintain our and the world’s 3 security. My fear is that because NSS 9/02 has the name “Bush” attached to it, it will be swept aside just as the new ideas of Akhenaton were when he died. This defacement will leave the world and us vulnerable to having to relearn the mistakes that Kaufman is warning us about by experiencing WWIII. The United States in the past has always been able to catch up in a late defense of its national interest and security, this time it may not. ***************** ****************************** Mackubin Thomas Owens in his review of Kaufman’s work gives the book high praise, which is certainly justified. Kaufman “has stepped into the breach to defend the Bush Doctrine--and to defend it quite ably. In this excellent new book, Kaufman describes the Bush approach to foreign policy as the latest example of what he calls "moral democratic realism," an approach he attributes to FDR, Truman, and Reagan as well.”7 Owens points out that however good and appropriate a theory may be, “we need to understand that adherence to a particular theory is not in itself a guarantee of success. In the recent past, U.S. foreign policy has been informed by realism (Nixon) and liberal multilateralism (Carter), and both failed. The Bush Doctrine too will fail, if it is not applied with prudence and blessed with a certain amount of good fortune.”8 Lee P. Ruddin is another reviewer who applauds this book in its entirety. Ruddin does not view this book as a “polemic. Kaufman succeeds in his aim to provide both a theoretical and historical source in defense of the Bush Doctrine. Kaufman’s water-tight case navigates the post-September 11 sea-change in international affairs, course-plotting through the sea-lanes of International Relations theory cruising to geographically diverse ports taking history aboard. All this makes for a memorable voyage.”9 “Kaufman’s text illuminates that, as written elsewhere by the precocious essayist, Douglas Murray, “there are still some who are willing to stand between the cowards and the barbarians and plant the flag of reason.””10 Colin Dueck’s review of “In Defense of the Bush Doctrine” is a scholarly work that deals with what he thinks is excellent work and areas where he does not agree or thinks that improvements or corrections could be made. Dueck, in my opinion, either misses the point that Kaufman’s book is not written as a defense of the war in Iraq but as a defense of NSS 9/02 which will forever carry the burden of the “Bush Doctrine” in some quarters. It is easy to see how he spends so much time commenting on the Iraq war but it does not seem to be done in conjunction with NSS 9/02. Kaufman in a short Epilogue deals with the Iraq war but it is not the central part of his book. He does not want to see NSS 9/02 abandoned, especially if the United States surrenders to the terrorists because it will then be needed more than ever as it will further encourage and embolden our enemies. Kaufman, a professor of public policy at Pepperdine University, lays out an overarching foreignpolicy approach he calls "moral democratic realism." The "realism" element lies in an appreciation of the perennially anarchic, dangerous features of world politics, where the use of force— including its preventive use—is therefore sometimes necessary to provide security. The "democratic" element lies in the belief that the spread of liberal democracy makes the world a freer, safer and more prosperous place; in contrast, undemocratic regimes represent an existential threat to American values as well as American interests. The "moral" element lies in the claim that 4 ordinary standards of Judeo-Christian morality can be applied to international relations, no less than to everyday life. Concepts of good and evil are not out of place in world politics.11 Dueck makes that interesting point that even though Kaufman is correct in his critique of other ways of developing a foreign policy, that this analysis does not necessarily make “moral democratic realism” correct for the United States. He is right to reject any sweeping disengagement from America’s strategic commitments overseas. He is right to say that America’s global presence provides certain indispensable public goods internationally. He is right to portray contemporary liberals as all too frequently wedded to a vision of multilateral institutions that has little relationship to international politics as it actually exists. He is right to say that many of the criticisms leveled against Bush as well as the war in Iraq have been overdone, wrongheaded or even hysterical.”12 Dueck does not agree with “Kaufman’s list of the many features and failings of realism, laid out above: It is at best a gross oversimplification and in many respects downright inaccurate.”13 Dueck is best when dealing with Kaufman’s concept of prudence with which he agrees and uses in his critique of our involvement in Iraq. “It is simply a question of whether the costs to the United States, in terms of overall nationalsecurity interests, outweigh the benefits of a given policy decision.”14 George Weigel also feels that “In Defense of the Bush Doctrine” should be “required reading for thoughtful candidates [decision makers and academics ant their students] and citizens alike.”15 Weigel feels that the cause of moral democratic realism could even be better served “might be more, well, realistic by describing their goal as the advance of responsible and responsive government in the Middle East, rather than as "democracy" (in our sense of the term). Still, Kaufman argues that this approach to world politics is more prudent than alternatives that neglect the true "root cause" of jihadist terrorism: "the insidious interaction of poverty, brutality, and oppression that spawns secular and religious radicals and rogue regimes implacably hostile to the United States mainly for what it is rather than what it does."16 In the end, to Weigel, “Kaufman is a man of uncommon intellectual courage”17 for the work he has done defining and supporting moral democratic realism as the proper and prudent way for the United States to pursue its security interests in a dangerous world.. In Kaufman’s own words, “In Defense of the Bush Doctrine” truly “fills a gaping hole in the literature on American foreign policy in general, and the current [Iraq]war in particular.”18, a statement with which I am in total agreement. If there are doubters, their ideas should be better because they have been tested against moral democratic realism, which is to me, American moral democratic realism. 11 Robert G. Kaufman, “In Defense of the Bush Doctrine”, (The University Press of Kentucky, Lexington, Kentucky, 2007)., p. 87. 2 Ibid., p. 43. 3 Ibid., p. 91. 4 Ibid., p. 91. 5 Ibid., p. 148. 6 Ibid., p. 155. 7 Mackubin Thomas Owens, “In the Tradition”, National Review, June 11, 2007, ISSN: 0028-0038. 8 Ibid. 9 Lee P. Ruddin: “Review of Robert G. Kaufman’s “In Defense of the Bush Doctrine”” (University Press of Kentucky, 2007), http://hnn.us/roundup/entries/39898.html. 10 Ibid. 11 Colin Dueck, “Doctrinal Faith”, May 1, 2007, http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=14146 12 Ibid. 13 Ibid. 14 Ibid. 15 George Weigel, “The Case for "Moral Democratic Realism"”, THE CATHOLIC DIFFERENCE, July 25, 2007, http://www.eppc.org/publications/pubID.3040/pub_detail.asp 16 17 Ibid. Ibid. 18 http://www.pepperdine.edu/pr/stories/kaufman.htm Bibliography Colin Dueck, “Doctrinal Faith”, May 1, 2007, http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx? id=14146 Robert G. Kaufman, “Public Policy Professor Robert G. Kaufman Defends Bush Doctrine in New Book”, http://www.pepperdine.edu/pr/stories/kaufman.htm. Robert G. Kaufman, “In Defense of the Bush Doctrine”, (The University Press of Kentucky, Lexington, Kentucky, 2007). Bob Nardini, Library Journal (04/01/2007), http://www.boonebridgebooks.com/In_Defense_Bush_Doctrine_Robert_G_Kaufman-i-0813124344 Mackubin Thomas Owens, “In the Tradition”, National Review, June 11, 2007, ISSN: 0028-0038. Lee P. Ruddin: “Review of Robert G. Kaufman’s “In Defense of the Bush Doctrine”” (University Press of Kentucky, 2007), http://hnn.us/roundup/entries/39898.html. George Weigel on "moral democratic realism", http://contrapauli.blogspot.com/2007/07/weigel-onmoral-democratic-realism.html George Weigel, “The Case for "Moral Democratic Realism"”, THE CATHOLIC DIFFERENCE, July 25, 2007, http://www.eppc.org/publications/pubID.3040/pub_detail.asp